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The return of “vulnerability”




There is something paradoxical about the rise and fall
–maybe we could speak about a renewed rise– of Raul
Prebisch’s thinking on what in the early years of his
intellectual life would have been called primary
producer economies. In parallel with what had
happened with development economics at large, by the
early 1960s or so his thinking was being progressively
dismissed both in public and academic discourse.1
In their more generous forms, the criticisms
levelled against Prebisch’s theories described them as
plainly out of date. From such a point of view they
might have been all right as an interpretation of events
in the pathological 1930s Depression years or the
immediate post-Second World War period, dominated
by scarcities and controls. But in the fast-growing world
economy of the 1960s, with a progressive opening-up
to international transactions, what was thought –in an
exaggerated way– to represent Prebisch’s teachings on
import substitution and State interventionism was
supposed to be no longer applicable.
Protagonists of those criticisms were basically the
advocates of liberalization of what were by then called
the developing economies. Import barriers had to come
down, foreign exchange controls eliminated, and
countries should stake all their fortunes on a fast
expansion of exports that would supposedly result from
the increased efficiency achieved through those
measures. Their success, which was perhaps not only
based on their capacity for intellectual argument, has
been phenomenal. The following decades have
witnessed the adoption, first gradual and reluctant in
most cases but turning into a stampede in the last
decade, of precisely those policies. And what have been
the consequences of all those reforms? An extraordinary
degree of instability, with repeated crises hitting what
are now termed “emerging economies”, highly
vulnerable to international economic shocks.
Those questioning Prebisch’s ideas, after having
been successful in reinstating a world economy quite
similar to that of the early twentieth century or the late
1920s, have ended up doing him the greatest possible
intellectual favour. Prebisch’s thinking on the
difficulties of a “peripheral” open economy under
financial globalization has now become highly topical.
In this paper, therefore, an attempt will be made to
show that Latin American economic problems mirror
the circumstances of the late 1920s, to say nothing of
the following depression decade. And, thus, all of a
sudden Prebisch’s thinking regains its relevance for the
present day. It is, in fact, to an early Prebisch that
reference will be made in this article: the Prebisch of
the late 1920s and early 1930s. At that time he was
* Centro de Estudios Avanzados, Universidad de Buenos Aires, and
Universidad de Bologna at Buenos Aires: (oconnell@mail.retina.ar).
A preliminary version of this paper was presented at the seminar
“Development theory at the dawn of the twenty-first century”, held
at ECLAC, Santiago, Chile, on 28-29 August 2001 (see ECLAC, 2001).
1 See, for example, Paul Krugman’s comments in his article entitled
“The fall and rise of development economics” (Krugman, 1994).
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more worried with what could be termed short-run
macroeconomic problems than with what were later to
be called development issues, to which his ECLA years
were devoted.
This paper is organized in the following way. First,
the progressively more unstable character of the world
economy in the last quarter of a century and its impact
on our region will be surveyed. Second, some parallels
will be drawn with the Argentine economy in the period
between the wars. Third, the early development of
Prebisch’s thinking in the late 1920s, as related to the
study of that economy, will be examined. And, fourth,
his first reactions to the Depression years will be
studied.
What will emerge from this analysis is an
awareness of how clear and true even to present-day
realities were Prebisch’s views about the problems of
an early “emerging market” economy, even though
there may not be unanimous agreement on his specific
economic policy proposals.
1. The instability of the world economy and the
renewed vulnerability of the Latin American
economies
Beginning in 1975 –and as acknowledged for instance
in several of the last issues of the IMF’s World Economic
Outlook– the world economy has undergone several
slumps. According to that publication, up to recently
there were four of these, although a fifth one in the
mid-1990s can also be detected.2 And right now –in
2001– another one which we could easily rate as a sixth
slump is taking place (figure 1).
The frequency of crises seems to be increasing,
since there have been six crises in about 25 years, but
four of them have taken place in the last 10 years, three
in the last five years, and two in the last three. Such a
casual perusal of the frequency of crises is confirmed
in, for instance, a recent study by Bordo, Eichengreen
and others (forthcoming). In their examination of 120
years of financial history, crisis frequency after 1973
turns out to have been double that of either the Classical
Gold Standard Period or the post-Bretton Woods one.
Interestingly enough for the argument we are trying to
develop in this paper, such frequency has been similar
to that of the period between the wars. Furthermore,
the last 25 years show a higher frequency of twin crises
(currency cum banking); these crises are known and
have been shown to be particularly severe and have
resulted in high output losses.
And, of course, as further background on the
instability in the world economy, we have also had the
extreme volatility of interest rates and exchange rates
among the major currencies, which some authors make
responsible for the behaviour of commodity prices: a
matter to which we will refer below.
Besides frequent slowdowns in economic activity
amplified by strong variations in international trade
volume (figure 2) and volatility of interest and exchange
rates, this last quarter of a century has shown
extraordinary variability in two other aspects of great
significance for developing countries, i.e., commodity
prices and capital flows.
As for real commodity prices, on the one hand,
recent studies have vindicated at least the facts of the
Prebisch-Singer hypothesis, i.e., that there is a long-
run trend –over a 140-year span– towards a decline in
2
 See, for example, IMF (1999, pp.2-5). In the graph on world
industrial production –figure 1.2. on page 5– of that same report, a
clear fifth slowdown may be detected in 1995, and not only in
Latin America.
FIGURE 2
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these prices (at the rate of 1.3% per year). Moreover,
there is a break around 1917 after which the decline
accelerates to 2.3% per year and in the 1990s to 6.9%
per year.3 Not only there is such a declining trend, but
also volatility has significantly increased in the later
period, with larger swings in prices and cycles of higher
frequency.4
It is also useful to remind ourselves that by the
beginning of the year 2000, real commodity prices were
fully 40% below their level at the beginning of the
1970s. The result of this on the terms of trade of
developing countries could not be more obvious, as may
be gathered from figure 3, on non-oil developing
countries.
A very similar story could be told with regard to
capital flows. Since the beginning of the 1970s, two
distinct boom and bust cycles may be detected. The
first one was the well-known cycle relating to bank loans
in the 1970s, which led to the “sudden stop” of the
early 1980s and to debt crises spanning the whole
decade. The second was the more recent boom of the
early 1990s, which was followed by the collapse which
began with the Asian crisis of 1997.
Quarterly figures for the last several years, when
superimposed on those long cycles, make it easy to
detect an extreme variability in the behaviour of private
capital flows. Most specifically, bank lending –and also
bond issues, although less so– displays extreme
volatility moderated by a more stable performance of
foreign direct investment. In fact, as may be seen from
figure 4, net non-equity capital flows have not only been
much more unstable but indeed in the last few years
have been nil or even negative.
Summing up, as should be well known –although
not always thoroughly recollected– the world economy
has shown an extraordinary degree of instability in the
post-Bretton Woods era and most specifically in the
last decade.
Latin America, of course, by “opening-up” both
to trade and financial relations with the world economy,
could hardly avoid being subject to that instability.
Growth rates of GDP and of international trade volume
played their part, as well as the behaviour of interest
rates, real commodity prices and capital flows.
Net transfers of resources, which on the whole were
positive in the 1990s (compared with the negative
figures of the 1980s) ended up the century by being
negative again, after having likewise shown a slump in
the mid-1990s (figure 5).
As it is well known, exports increased at a faster
rate than in previous decades, but imports increased
3
 See Cashin and McDermott, 2001.
4
 “...rapid, unexpected and often large movements in commodity
prices are an important feature of the behavior of commodity
prices.” (Cashin and McDermott, 2001, p. 25).
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even faster. The result was the emergence of sizeable
trade deficits, only moderated or turned positive under
recessionary conditions (figure 6).
Coupled with a negative balance on real and
financial services, current accounts became increasingly
negative, even in terms of a larger GDP (figure 7).
Furthermore, by the end of the decade external debt
ratios –with respect to exports and to GDP– had started
to climb again and were standing at levels similar to
those that had prevailed at the beginning of the 1980s
crisis. It was of course precisely the renewed
accumulation of foreign indebtedness that led to the
expansion in ouflows on account of financial services.
And although short-term debt –as a percentage of
foreign exchange reserves– was low and falling towards
the end of the 1990s, financing requirements –short-
term debt plus service on long-term debt coming due
within a year– were building up as a consequence of
the sheer growth of the external debt (figure 9).
Rapidly growing imports plus large external
financing requirements (figure 10) have made the region
extremely vulnerable to the vagaries of the world
economy. Country-risk spreads reveal the volatile
evolution over time of the creditworthiness ratings of
FIGURE 4
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the countries in the region in the eyes of the international
financial markets, and the resultant instability of their
access to resources.
No wonder, therefore, that under those various
pressures crises have repeatedly visited the region and
a number of countries –including all the major ones–
have been placed at risk of a collapse in their exchange
rate pegs and/or their debt service (figure 11).
Not surprisingly, vulnerability to an unstable
international economy and most specifically to volatile
financial flows has resulted in high “real instability”
for Latin American economies, even if the much-praised
price stability has basically been achieved. But what
also must be recalled is that the last decade’s average
rate of growth on the whole was only marginally greater
than that of the “lost decade” of the 1980s (3.0%
compared with 2.1% per annum).5 Thus, if the 1980s
was the “lost decade”, then the 1990s may well be
baptised the “roller-coaster decade” (figure 12).
2. The Argentine economy in the late 1920s
Parallels with the Argentine economy in the late 1920s
–the period when Raúl Prebisch started developing his
ideas about the “peripheral economy”– are many. We
have already noted that in terms of frequency of crises
5
 See IMF, 2001.
FIGURE 9
Latin America and the Caribbean: Short-term debt as a










































































Latin America and the Caribbean: Financing requirements
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as well as of the behaviour of commodity prices, the
period between the wars was that –out of all the periods
in the last 120-odd years– which was most similar to
the post-Bretton Woods era and most specifically to
the last decade.
Let us take a look at the Argentine economy of
those years. Crises and fluctuations did not first visit
the country only after 1929. The idyllic version of an
exclusively prosperous 1920s is far from the facts. A
clear pattern of economic fluctuations had previously
emerged, to the point of being christened by Prebisch
and his team as the “ciclo económico argentino”
(“Argentine business cycle”). Unlike, for instance, the
U.S. business cycle that was being analysed by Mitchell
and the NBER in those same years, that of Argentina,
Prebisch and his team posited, was dominated by the
instability of exports and capital inflows rather than by
that of domestic investment.6
The reasons for export instability were several.
First, exports were overwhelmingly agricultural
exports. In the period from 1923 to 1927, on average,
96% of exports originated in the agricultural sector.7
Moreover just four products (wheat, maize, linseed and
beef) made up two-thirds of the total.8
Some studies published at that time or immediately
afterwards would show a chronic trend, beginning by
the end of the 19th century, for instance, for wheat prices
to decline in real terms.9 Additionally, Argentina was
far from being a marginal supplier in some of these
markets so that, as conditions of over-supply worsened
after the First World War, her exports were bound to
encounter barriers.10
As mentioned above, recent studies of long-run
trends have confirmed that a declining trend in real
primary product prices was taking place. No wonder,
therefore, that when he observed the late 1920s
situation, Prebisch started placing emphasis on the
“trend towards a deterioration of the terms of trade
between primary products and manufactured products”.
Going back to fluctuations, however, a second
characteristic of Argentine exports to which Prebisch’s
attention was drawn and was confirmed again later was
6
 For an examination of the Argentine economy of those years, see
Revista Económica (there is an English version published as
Economic Review) of the Banco de la Nación Argentina (BNA,
various issues), which was continued for a brief period after 1935
–as a new series– by the newly created Central Bank of Argentina.
An Economic Research Department, which published that review,
had been organized at the Bank under the direction of Raúl Prebisch.
For a survey of its studies see the first section –“The Argentine
Business Cycle”– of O’Connell, 1984.
7
 Fifty-five per cent were agricultural products and 41% produce
from stockbreeding activity. See Dirección Nacional de Estadística
y Censos (DNEC, 1921, 1922, 1923, 1924, 1926, 1927, 1928, 1929).
8
 Wheat made up 22% of total exports, maize 19%, linseed 12%
and beef 11%. Those exports had another very special characteristic
distinguishing them from those of other primary producers, such
as for instance Brazil, which exported coffee: i.e., those Argentine
exports –being temperate-zone agricultural products– entered into
competition with the domestic output of the more advanced Western
European and North American countries.
9
 Mandelbaum (1953) shows that wheat prices had been falling –in
real terms– since the early 1880s. For V. P. Timoshenko (1933), the
prices of fifteen important agricultural products were already falling
by the mid-1920s, not to speak to what happened later in the early
years of the Depression. In Argentina, wheat prices fell from an
average of 15.13 pesos per quintal (100 kg) in the 1920/1924 period
to 10.50 pesos in 1927/1928 and 9.68 in 1928/1929, well before
the Wall Street crisis.
10
 Argentina was the second world exporter of wheat –22% of the
total– and the leading exporter of maize, with more than two-thirds
of the total. Its shares of world exports of beef (61%) and linseed
(80%) was also very high. See Taylor and Taylor (1943) for the
shares of Argentine exports in world markets. By the 1920s,
agriculture in the industrialized countries had become a sector in
crisis, where protectionism and measures of direct support to
domestic producers were becoming rampant. In fact the First World
War had thrown the whole world agricultural sector out of balance.
As output fell in continental Europe due to the ravages of trench
warfare, the overseas producers had experienced a boom in output.
The return to normal of European agriculture by the mid-1920s
–under a panoply of support measures– produced a situation of
chronic oversupply, however. For an account of the mounting tide
of protectionism, whose roots lay in the late nineteenth century,
see O’Connell, 1986 (this volume, by the way, was dedicated to
“Raúl Prebisch - Elder Statesman of the Emerging Nations”,
Prebisch having attended the seminar at St. Antony’s College,
Oxford, at which most of the contributions for that volume were
first presented).
FIGURE 12
Latin American and the Caribbean: Real GDP growth rates,
1979-2001
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their extraordinary price volatility, further compounded
in those years by an instability in volumes (figure 13)
due to weather factors and a cobweb-type cattle cycle.
As domestic consumption showed a steady trend,
volatility in output translated into volatility of exports.11
In spite of some inverse relation between export
prices and export volumes –to be expected of a country
which was not a price-taker for quite a few products–
export values also showed a high degree of instability.
In fact, in the period from 1917 to 1929 this was much
higher than in any other period of Argentine economic
history and well above that experienced by developing
countries in the Bretton Woods era.12
Had import prices fluctuated in the same direction
and magnitude as export prices, the volatility would
have been neutral for the country as a whole, although
it would have had significant income redistribution
consequences. But that was far from being the case.
Thus, the terms of trade experienced wide swings before
1930 and only recovered the level prior to the First
World War by 1946-1950.13
Not only did the terms of trade experience strong
fluctuations but also, on average, over the 1920s they
were at the same level as over the 1930s and in both
cases 27% below that of 1913. Once again, a picture of
the 1920s prior to the October 1929 Wall Street crash
emerges which is anything but idyllic.
Imports, on the other hand, were quite a high share
of GDP, almost 25% in 1925-1929. In this same period
imports supplied 13% of consumption, while those of
machinery and equipment represented 35% of domestic
investment.14
Furthermore, as analysed by Prebisch’s team,
imports also displayed a high income-elasticity and a
ratchet effect, as there was some inertia in their
adaptation to lower levels of national income.
Consequently, when an export downturn –or a drop in
capital inflows– hit the country, leading first to a scarcity
of foreign exchange and second to a drop in GDP, the
preservation for a time of high levels of imports resulted
in further pressure on the availability of foreign
exchange. In fact, wide swings in trade balances were
experienced as may be visualized in figure 15.15
The second element of instability identified by
Prebisch was that originating in capital inflows. Gross
capital inflows amounted to the equivalent of 10% of
exports, making them a significant supplier of foreign
exchange. Contrary to what is habitually asserted as
11
 For an analysis of export volume instability, see BNA (1930) and
also BCRA (1937a and 1937b). For an instability index following
MacBean see Diéguez (1972). Prices were normally less unstable
than volumes, but in the period from 1917 to 1929 the instability
of prices was slightly higher than that of volumes (12.5% versus
12.2% respectively).
12
 The instability index –à la MacBean– for export values in the
1917-1929 period was 16.8%, while that estimated by MacBean
for developing countries in the 1948-1958 period was only 9.06%
(Diéguez, 1972).
13
 For a terms of trade index see Ministerio de Finanzas de la
Nación/BCRA, 1952.
14
 The years of the First World War had shown how essential imports
were for the performance of the economy, when a dearth of supplies
–plus, admittedly, a crisis of the building sector due to financial
difficulties– resulted in the worst slump of the whole century.
15
 For figures on the share of imports in GDP, consumption and
investment, see ECLAC, 1958, tables 24 and 25. In the 1996-1998
period, when Argentina was recovering from the “tequila” crisis,
the import elasticity of the country was between 3 and 4. That is
very similar to the levels of most present-day “emerging market
economies”, consequently putting their external position in danger.
FIGURE 13
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being different in that world compared with the present-
day one, on average in the 1920s fully 53% of those
inflows went to the private sector and only the
remainder to the public debt.16
Capital inflows to the private sector were largely
made up of foreign direct investment, which however,
as it is today, was to a significant extent financed by
debt issues. In stock terms, foreign direct investment
(FDI) accounted for 32% of the estimated total capital
invested in Argentina, and gross inflows were 10% of
fixed capital formation.17
Capital inflows were notoriously unstable,
however, as may be gathered from figure 16, concerning
the period between the wars, which shows that this
instability was already clearly present in the 1920s.
The instability of exports and capital inflows was
transmitted to the economy through various
mechanisms.
On the income side, exports in the period 1925-
1929 represented 24% of GDP and more than two-thirds
of the final demand for “Pampa” produce. Agriculture,
for its part, accounted for between 25% and 30% of
GDP at 1950 prices, which were admittedly extremely
low for these sectors, so that its true weight was surely
much larger.18 The upturns and downturns of exports,
therefore, were bound to have a strong impact on GDP.
As to capital inflows, both private and public sector
expenditure levels had to accommodate themselves to
their availability, as they were an important source of
finance.
Shocks were also transmitted via the fiscal and
monetary systems. Three-fourths of government current
revenue came from customs duties and other taxes on
foreign trade. Therefore, to a great extent, they
oscillated with what we have seen were highly volatile
exports and imports. The availability of resources for
government expenditure was also determined by the
capacity to acquire further indebtedness. But, as may
be gathered from figure 17, showing strong variations
in the stock of public debt, such capacity underwent
significant instability.
It is in relation to the monetary mechanism,
however, that the parallels with present-day
preoccupations are more striking. The monetary system
of Argentina in those years was called a “sporadic gold
standard” by Mr. Hueyo, a Minister of Finance in the
early 1930s.19 In fact, Argentina had adopted a Currency16 See Ministerio de Finanzas de la Nación/BCRA, 1952.
17
 For these figures see ECLAC, 1958. Fully 60% of FDI originated
in the United Kingdom; in turn, in 1929 Argentina accounted for
27% of all the UK’s FDI and 42% of that in “foreign countries”,
i.e., in countries other than those of what was still the British Empire
(see United Nations, 1949, table 7). For the United States, Argentina
was much less important as a recipient of FDI –only 8% of the total–
and ranked behind other countries in Latin America (see United
Nations, 1949, table 6). However, many United States firms started
to establish themselves in the Argentine market, manufacturing
motor vehicles, electrical home appliances, cosmetics, and other
things (see Phelps, 1936, and Whyte, 1945).
18
 See ECLAC, 1958.
19
 Mr. Hueyo’s pronouncements on the Argentine monetary system
may be found in Ministerio de Hacienda y Obras y Servicios
Públicos, Secretaría de Hacienda, 1932. Hueyo –following orthodox
teaching and as Mr. Hoover did in the United States– tried in 1932-
1933 to stabilize the economy through the reduction of fiscal
deficits: a feat he almost succeeded in, but with less than favourable
consequences for economic recovery.
FIGURE 15
Argentina: Exports, imports and balance
of trade, 1913-1940
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FIGURE 16
Argentina: Gross capital inflows, 1919-1939
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Board system early in the twentieth century but had
abandoned “convertibility” –to use modern Argentine
parlance– at the beginning of the First World War, only
resuming the operation of the Currency Board in August
1927.20
As with many other cases of premature resumption
of the Gold Standard in the 1920s, the experiment failed
by late 1929 and the country only returned to a Currency
Board system in early 1991, this time on a U.S. dollar
standard.
Of course, under the Currency Board system credit
and money supply had to accommodate to the vagaries
of the trade balance and of net capital inflows. The
Central Bank was only created in 1935, so that some of
the functions of “lender of last resort” were fulfilled
by the Banco de la Nación Argentina, echoes of which
may be detected under the “tequila” crisis and under
today’s –what we should call it?– “tango” crisis.21
Instability of exports and capital inflows, therefore,
not only directly hit the balance of payments position
but was also transmitted to the rest of the economy
through the workings of income and monetary links.
The experience of the 1920s had shown, in fact,
that a cycle based on the instability of exports and
capital inflows, amplified by income and fiscal/
monetary mechanisms, had become clearly established.
A slump in incomes of various sections of the
population –remember again the significance of price
deflation– had inaugurated the decade. The sharp
reduction in agricultural prices after the end of the war
had a special impact on Argentina, which was dependent
on those products. After deflation had run its course,
there was a recovery which was followed, in the 1922
to 1924 period, with good harvests and the beginnings
of large capital inflows originating in the United States.
A bad harvest in the 1924-1925 season, however, caused
a new decline in economic activity (accentuated by
renewed deflation), which extended into 1926.22
Beginning in that latter year, a new phase of
expansion set in, but this time prices showed a slight
downward trend. Due to a rise in exports and capital
inflows, the peso started appreciating, leading to the
reinstatement of the Currency Board system –a return to
the Gold Standard– in August 1927. Government
borrowing abroad expanded even faster, and gold entered
the country, resulting in a big increase in reserves. This
expansion found support in the policy of the U.S. Federal
Reserve, which had cut interest rates by that time,
resulting in an outflow of capital from the United States.23
During that expansive period, currency and
deposits increased. Lending, however, did not expand
at an equivalent rate as banks tried to rebuild reserves
and cancel old credits: a hangover from the previous
downturn. The Banco de la Nación Argentina –which
in the absence of a Central Bank proper was half-
playing that role and had extended credit to other banks
during the previous period of stress– started recovering
those loans.2420
 The opening of the Currency Board, in 1927, pitted the politically
powerful agricultural exporters against foreign investors. Exporters
asked for a return to “convertibility” because the peso was
appreciating too much, even beyond parity, while foreign investors
were happy to see their earnings in pesos translated into larger
amounts of pounds sterling and other foreign currencies.
21
 In 1932, an “Empréstito Patriótico” was launched –like those in
1995 and now in 2001– but for lack of demand it ended up being
purchased by the Banco de la Nación Argentina (a publicly-owned
bank created after the crisis of 1890), using for the first time a
Rediscount Law that had been passed back in 1914 to counter the
crisis unleashed by the war in Europe. Mr. Hueyo asked for the
advice of the Bank of England in setting up a Central Bank. As
“money doctor” the Bank of England sent down a high-ranking
official, Sir Otto Niemeyer, who was extremely critical of the Gold
Standard. See his opinions in Revista económica (BNA, 1934).
22
 See BNA (1929c) for an account of the early and mid-1920s
cycles.
23
 For an analysis of the impact –not only on Argentina but on the
world economy– of Federal Reserve Policy in the late 1920s, see
BNA, 1929a. In August 1927, the Fed had lowered interest rates to
3 ½ % from 4% and engaged in an active “open market” policy of
credit expansion. But beginning in early 1928 that policy was
reversed because of increasing concern about the “irrational
exuberance” of Wall Street; bonds were sold, and after successive
increases interest rates stood at 5% by July 1928. Argentina’s
international reserves increased from U$S 466.5 million in January
1927 to a peak of U$S 680.1 million in July 1928
24
 From the high point of June 1927, interest rates fell from an
average of 6.75% to 5.75% by July 1928. See BNA, 1929b.
FIGURE 17
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The 1928-1929 period is extremely interesting for
our attempt at drawing parallels with the most recent
decade and the present-day situation. As might be
gathered from the previous figures, exports increased
less and imports kept growing at a faster pace than in
the previous expansion. On top of this, capital inflows
started declining and some funds left the country as
the tightening up by the Fed, plus the Wall Street boom,
attracted them towards New York. Beginning in the
second half of 1928 –way before the Wall Street crash–
gold started leaving the country, mainly as a
consequence of its boom rather than of the later crash.
By the end of 1929 –when the Currency Board was
closed down again– all the gold –or even slightly more–
which had entered Argentina after the return to the Gold
Standard had been lost.25 Bank reserves started
declining after September 1928, reaching a point lower
than that prior to the 1927-1928 boom. Once again the
Banco de la Nación Argentina was playing a
compensatory role by lending to the government and
other banks.26
A drastic fall in export prices was the reason for
lagging exports, which added to the crisis unleashed
by the financial movements. Wheat harvests in the main
producing countries in 1928/29 were much larger than
in previous years and led to further accumulation of
already heavy unsold stocks. Between May 1928 and
May 1929 –again well before the Wall Street crash–
wheat prices in Argentina fell 30%. Although not all
agricultural prices fell so heavily, the general index
dropped 7% between 1928 and 1929. Land prices fell
in sympathy with these movements.27
The stage was set for a significant slump in
economic activity, even before the Wall Street crash of
October 1929 signalled the beginning of the Depression
that would dominate the following decade.
3. The early development of Prebisch’s thinking
about the “Argentine business cycle”
Surveying that experience, Prebisch coined the
expression “Argentine business cycle” to describe it.
Economic policy and the conduct of private as well as
public affairs, he insisted, had better take it for granted
that a new downturn would always be just around the
corner, even during what could look like the most solid
of booms. This seems a very prescient outlook
compared with that of the advocates of the “new
economy” and of the endless indebtedness of the
emerging market countries.28
Leaving aside the impact of weather on the volume
of produce available for export, the other factors
determining that cycle –prices and demand for
agricultural goods and capital inflows– were intimately
connected with international economic behaviour. In
the case of Argentina, which did not have a domestic
machinery-producing sector, the “accelerator”
mechanism that Prebisch considered to be behind the
cyclical behaviour of advanced countries was not
applicable. In his opinion, therefore, all the instability
originated abroad.
Furthermore, when analysing the instability of
capital inflows, Prebisch came to a very up-to-date
conclusion widely accepted nowadays: i.e., that capital
flows are negatively connected with activity levels in
what he was later to label the “monetary centres”. As
New York was almost the only such centre in the 1920s,
capital inflows would be threatened when, as happened
in 1928-1929, a boom in the United States economy
and in the stock markets –accompanied by an attempt
by the Federal Reserve to stop the “irrational
exuberance”– would determine a capital drain from
Argentina. The cycle in Argentina, therefore, tended to
be the reverse of the United States one: something
reinforced by the fact that sales to that country
represented only a tiny fraction of total exports.29
In his view, the contrast between the high instability
of exports and capital inflows and some rigid elements
of the economic structure made Argentina extremely
“vulnerable” to that instability.
25
 See BNA, 1929d. Between September 1928 and December 17,
1929 –when the Currency Board was closed down– gold outflows
amounted to 187.6 million gold pesos (roughly equivalent to pre-
1933 dollars), which was slightly more than the 179.4 million that
had entered Argentina since the opening of the Currency Board
back in August 1927.
26
 Thus, in spite of the outflows to New York, bank lending increased
15% between September 1928 and December 1929 (BNA, 1929d).
27
 For the behaviour of land prices see Sociedad Rural Argentina,
1979.
28
 In a later pronouncement, Prebisch said: “Even though there
may be no idea of how, in what form, or at what particular moment
the cyclic reaction will take place after boom periods, the fact that
we know of its inevitability is sufficient to justify the timely
adoption of measures to moderate the size of the fluctuation or
reduce its economic and social consequences”. See BCRA, 1938.
29
 In 1925, only 8% of Argentine exports were directed to the United
States market. Imports from that country, on the other hand, had
come to account for 23% of total Argentine imports, and the United
States had become Argentina’s largest supplier, displacing the
United Kingdom (see Dirección Nacional de Comercio Exterior,
1941).
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To begin with, mention has already been made of
the behaviour of imports: their rapid expansion resulting
in trade imbalances in booms and temporary downward
rigidity in slumps, thus making those imbalances even
worse. Government finances, also, tended to behave in
an asymmetrical manner. When funds were easily
available, expenditure –which was also supported by
the higher revenues fed by the ensuing expansion of
the economy– would increase at a fast pace. But in a
downturn, the reduction of such expenditure became
more difficult because of the rigidity of commitments
previously entered into. Consequently, in slumps there
was a tendency for fiscal deficits to explode, thus
preventing the economy from adapting to the new level
of availability of foreign exchange.
Additionally, service on foreign debt in the 1920s,
on average, absorbed 20% of export proceeds (this
proportion shot up to 35% in the first few years of the
Depression). Current account deficits plus amortization
on private and public lending resulted in high financing
requirements, so that although it normally registered
trade surpluses, year after year the country had to find
large new resources to finance service on foreign debt
and investment.30
There were therefore two almost fixed charges
against foreign exchange proceeds: somewhat rigid
imports, and service payments on the foreign debt and
capital invested in the country. In contrast, both exports
and capital inflows were extremely volatile. According
to Prebisch those were the circumstances that made the
Argentine economy “vulnerable” to an unstable
international economy.
Out of those observations on the sources of
instability and the rigidity of some elements in the
economy, in the late 1920s Prebisch developed his
model of the “Argentine business cycle”. In this model
the mechanics of the cycle hinged upon credit and
monetary expansion and contraction and their impact
on import levels. Only later, in the 1930s, did the
Keynesian –or Khanian– income multiplier enter into
his analysis.
In Prebisch’s scheme, expansion of exports –due
to a bigger harvest but mainly to better market
conditions abroad– or larger capital inflows leads to
the creation of “high-powered money”. Banks expand
through the “monetary base” multiplier, creating
purchasing power additional to that originally produced
by the inflow from abroad. Trade and industry expand
and imports –remember that they form a high
proportion of GDP– surge up and the expanded
availability of foreign exchange is rapidly exhausted.
Either gold –under the “Currency Board” system– or
“foreign exchange” start leaving the country or, under
the floating exchange regime that predominated in
Argentina for some time after the closing of the
“Currency Board”, the national currency will
experience a depreciation. A cyclical downturn in either
export proceeds or capital inflows may add an
additional recessionary force on top of all this. In the
meantime, foreign obligations also have increased.
The scene is now set for the descending phase of
the cycle. The outflow of gold and foreign exchange
contracts the monetary base and the expansion of credit
not only comes to a halt but in fact reverses itself. For
that to happen smoothly, Prebisch insists, credit should
have been granted only for short-term purposes,
meaning that its repayment would be almost automatic,
its purpose of financing merchandise trade having been
fulfilled. If that had been the case, no financial crisis
should necessarily happen. If expectations of sales had
been too optimistic, some difficulty could arise in the
repayment of credit, but then it would be the
responsibility of the commercial banks and the Central
Bank to resort to their reserves and rediscounting
operations to fix the problem. Thus what Prebisch
would criticize as an unwarranted contraction of credit
could be avoided.
On the other hand, Prebisch took a strong stance
vis à vis those advocating the use of bank credit to
finance long-run investment. In his opinion, a confusion
between credit and savings is the reason for advocating
this, and banks should refrain from granting credit for
such purposes unless funds from the public have been
collected specifically for that purpose. Again the main
reason for his opposition is based on the impact of such
operations on imports, and consequently on foreign
imbalances.
If the cycle has followed its course and the whole
country has been subject to its ups and downs, however,
the government’s financial position also suffers because
of the impact on revenues. And, then, the rigidity of
fiscal expenditure coupled with that of imports would
only worsen the imbalances that the economy has run
into. Prebisch also points out the pernicious character
30
 Financing requirements were around 25% to 30% of exports in
the 1920s, increasing to almost 60% in the 1930s. On the whole,
the net transfer of resources was clearly negative; in the 1925-1929
period it came to almost 5% of GDP. For figures on the debt burden
and financing requirements in relation to export proceeds, see
Ministerio de Finanzas de la Nación/BCRA (1952), and for the net
negative transfer of resources, see ECLAC (1958), tables 24 and 28.
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of short-run capital inflows: what he labels as “floating
funds”. In his vision, these funds “...tend to duplicate
foreign exchange demand; once to pay for imports that
result from their inflow and (twice) for the need to
support their later outflow”.31
Prebisch also introduced another element in his
analysis of the short-run behaviour of an “emerging
market economy”. Businessmen’s expectations are
brought in as a motive force that could lead to the
expansion or contraction of output and the consequent
demand for credit. In the case of a rural country,
however, he made those expectations dependent on the
state of the rural sector, thus returning to the idea that
weather and external prices are the main determinants
of the cycle, coupled with the vagaries of capital
inflows.
In all his writings and analyses, dependence on
imports –with its high income elasticity to increases in
GDP and its asymmetric downward rigidity– is the factor
that plays the main role in erecting an insurmountable
obstacle to expansion and also to any attempt at a
counter-cyclical policy –such as an expansive monetary
policy– in conditions of a balance of payments crisis.
Economic policy therefore had very limited
autonomy for coping with the “Argentine business
cycle”. With such a primitive fiscal and monetary
system as the one described above, many instruments
for such counter-cyclical policies simply did not exist.
The only possible course was one of extreme prudence
during expansionary periods so that excessive credit
and government expenditure based on further
indebtedness could be avoided. That would make what
Prebisch considered to be the inevitable downturn more
manageable.
4. The Depression and further developments in
Prebisch’s thinking
It was under such circumstances that a new downturn
in the international economy –beginning in late 1929–
hit the country. Export prices continued to fall until
1932, and import prices also fell, although less so. As a
result, the terms of trade deteriorated over that four-
year period.32 Price levels were also important, and not
only their relative decline. Thus, in 1932 export prices
stood at half their pre-First World War level, placing an
enormous burden on the indebtedness of producers and
their creditors.
For their part, capital inflows almost dried up, only
partially recovering in 1933.33
The Argentine economy only began to recover in
1934 (and even more firmly afterwards) due to a
prolonged serious drought in North America that later
extended to Australia. On the one hand, this drought
generated the famous “dust bowl” that brought
misfortune to poor farmers in the United States, but on
the other hand it brought prosperity to Argentina, which
saw its export prices climbing by the second quarter of
1934 to unexpected levels. The country experienced a
balance of payments bonanza fed by exports at those
high prices, and on top of this a return of capital inflows
partly due to political instability in Central Europe. This
time, however, these inflows were mainly short-term
and started leaving the country as soon as the situation
began to deteriorate in 1937 (with the recovery of
harvests in the main competing countries).
Argentina, which almost alone had not defaulted
on its foreign debt service, actually repatriated part of
it, besides engaging in major domestic sterilization
operations.34
The consequences of the abundance of foreign
exchange were obvious: imports shot up –by 74%
between 1932 and 1937– and GDP expanded by 27% in
that same period.35
31
 See BCRA, 1937c, chapter II for this sentence (my translation)
and, more generally, for a succinct later account of Prebisch’s
thinking about the “Argentine business cycle”.
32
 Export prices fell 64% between 1928 and 1932, while the terms
of trade dropped 40% over the same period. For figures on foreign
trade prices and terms of trade, see Ministerio de Finanzas de la
Nación/BCRA (1952).
33
 Some short-run “compensatory finance” (in reality, it was used
to repay a previous loan from Phoenix Corp.) was provided –in the
absence of a body like the IMF– by Brown-Harriman of New York,
and the British railway companies managed to issue some
debentures in both 1930 and 1931.
34
 Perusal of the minutes of the discussions for the Anglo-Argentine
Treaty of 1933 reveals that the Argentine delegation was insistent
in complying with full debt service, even under pressure from the
British side to leave some resources for British exports and, above
all, for profit remittances by British-owned firms –especially the
railways– in Argentina. By the way, Raúl Prebisch was a member
of that Argentine delegation as financial expert; in 1933 he was
formally still an official of the Research Department of the Banco
de la Nación Argentina, in which capacity he had been invited to
attend the preparatory meetings (in Geneva) for that year’s World
Economic Conference and had gained the appreciation of the head
of the British delegation, Sir Frederick Leith-Ross. Later in the
1930s the newly created Central Bank and its General Manager,
Raúl Prebisch, were widely praised, for instance by the League of
Nations economic and financial section, for the debt repatriation
and sterilization measures adopted.
35
 Export prices increased by 43% in 1933-34, 21% in 1935-36
and 22% in 1936-37. By 1937 the terms of trade were at their highest
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In opposition to both traditional and some modern
scholarship, Prebisch himself, however, was careful not
to claim that the recovery was mainly due to the policies
followed. In the Economic Review, published since the
mid-1930s by the Central Bank, Prebisch –speaking
again about the cycle the country had been going
through– said: “From 1934 up to the present there has
been… a gradual improvement (of the economic
situation in Argentina), partly brought about by the
adoption of measures tending to facilitate readjustment
of international accounts and revive internal economic
activity, but mainly as the result of the gradual rise in
the world prices of the country’s export products”.36
The way in which Argentina overcame the
Depression, therefore, was more related to “exogenous”
events –a prolonged and serious drought that hit foreign
competitors– than to any shift in economic policy-
making. At the same time, however, it is true that the
crisis forced some changes both in economic policy
and in economic structure.
In terms of shifts in economic policy “régime”,
perhaps the most important event was the introduction
of exchange controls right after the pound sterling went
off the gold standard in September 1931. Priority was
given to essential imports and the service of the foreign
debt, with other imports and remittances of profits being
relegated to a second order of importance.
Once again, rather than fed by a visionary policy
of “import substitution”, rationing of foreign exchange
became a necessity because of the balance of payments
crisis. Exchange controls were to remain in place for
decades, although undergoing significant changes, the
first one inspired by Prebisch himself at the end of
1933.37 Rationing of foreign exchange, in fact, took
the place of a true real devaluation like those undergone
by other countries in South America. 38
Almost as soon as the new scheme was introduced
in late November 1933, foreign exchange –boosted by
good market conditions for Argentine exports– became
abundant for reasons already mentioned. The market-
determined “free rate” tended to fall towards the pegged
“official” rate, at which point the authorities decided
to fix the margin between the two. In this sense –as
Prebisch acknowledged later in life– it was confirmed
that the system was being used mainly as an element
of discrimination in favour of Great Britain and some
of the European countries and against the United States.
Investors and exporters from those countries were to
benefit from the official rate, while United States
exporters and firms established in Argentina had to
resort to the “free” market. Such a policy, of course,
had to do with the extreme triangularity of Argentine
trade, that worsened the sterling area deficit with the
U.S. dollar area, and the leverage Great Britain had to
force the country into a bilateral exchange agreement.
The other decisive innovation in the economic
policy régime was the institution of a Central Bank,
beginning in 1935. This move consolidated and
reinforced the role that the Banco de la Nación
Argentina had been playing in shoring up banks –and
the government– and represented a further step away
from the “Currency Board” system.
As already noted, Sir Otto Niemeyer –our British
“money doctor”– was extremely critical of the workings
of the Gold Standard, and although Prebisch disagreed
with Sir Otto about some of his recommendations for
the Central Bank, he did share those criticisms.
The Gold Standard –or the “Currency Board”
system based on gold– was deemed to be too rigid a
mechanism both in the upswing and in the downswing
for a country whose economy was dominated by
frequent movements in export values and capital
inflows. It would lead to easy over-expansion in an era
of abundant foreign exchange and to excessive
contraction in a moment of slump.
Thus, Prebisch –who always had thought of himself
as an orthodox economist– ended up defending the
exchange control system. In his view, exchange controls
were absolutely necessary in order to be able to
introduce a “national monetary policy” that would gain
some autonomy for the country from world forces
beyond its control. He thought of exchange controls
only as a mechanism in the financial sphere and not
level in the century up to that moment. Export values rose
explosively by 128% between 1932 and 1937. For an account of
how the drought in North America determined the recovery of the
Argentine economy, see O’Connell (1984).
36
 See BCRA, 1937c, page 1.
37
 Under the new régime instituted in November 1933, a “free
market” was established, separated from the “official” market. In
the free market exchange would be sold by the authorities by
auction. That was thought to introduce an element of flexibility
that would lead to the gradual fading away of the controls. The
official market, in its turn, was divided between a buying and a
selling rate, with some margin in between. This margin was to pay
for the increased cost of foreign public debt service –after a
devaluation of around 20% was introduced– plus a price support
scheme for wheat, maize and linseed.
38
 In Argentina, the peso had become overvalued against the pound
sterling over the 1929-1933 period, and this was not fully corrected
by the devaluation of November 1933.
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–at least in his writings– as an element of protectionism
for the country’s produce. For that, he said, Argentina
must have its own customs policy; otherwise this would
be imposed by the great powers.
The other novel element in Prebisch’s thinking was
that relating to the role of industry. Industrialization –a
larger share of GDP originating in manufacturing
activities– was reckoned as a further way to regain
autonomy, as this sector would be less connected with
developments abroad. At that time, however, his
writings did not contain any of the other arguments in
favour of industrialization that would make him and
ECLA famous in the late 1940s.
For the rest, both in his writings, speeches and
lectures and in economic policy making Prebisch
resorted to consecrated orthodox solutions, i.e., a
restrictive monetary policy and sound government
finance as well as a banking system based on short-
term credit and under strong supervision by the Central
Bank, and of course the honouring of debts. No wonder,
then, that if a comparison is made between the
availability of foreign exchange and the rate of growth
of GDP or of manufacturing in Argentina and in other
“emerging market” economies of the era –Brazil and
Chile in South America as well as India or the Danube
basin countries in Europe– the performance of
Argentina was decidedly slower.39
In the present new era of financial globalization,
however, Prebisch’s vision of the problems of an
“emerging market economy” in an unstable
international system has regained significance and it
stands as a source of insights about its mechanics.
“Vulnerability” is back with us. From that point of view
his enemies –advocating the reinstatement of “free”
international trade and capital movements– have ended
up paying him the greatest homage of them all.
(Original: English)
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